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Abstract
What role do community norms play in the diffusion and persistence of new organizational practices? We
explore this question through an examination of the widespread practice of wage arrears, the late and nonpayment of wages, in Russia during the 1990s. Existing research on wage arrears most often examines this
practice as a means of flexible wage adjustment under difficult economic conditions. We develop an alternative
theory that explains wage arrears through their acceptance as a legitimate form of organizational behavior within
local communities. Our empirical analysis finds some support for the neoclassical position that wage arrears
reflect adjustment to negative shocks, but this perspective fails to account for a number of important facts,
including a high level of arrears among apparently successful firms. In contrast, our results find strong support
for the institutional perspective. The statistical analysis demonstrates powerful and robust community effects
both in firm adoption of this practice, controlling for firm performance, liquidity, and fixed firm effects, and in
workers’ reaction to arrears, through their quit (exit) and strike (voice) behavior.
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A core insight of institutional theories across multiple disciplines is that social and economic
outcomes are not produced solely by the aggregation of individual behavior but also by the collective
rules, norms, and beliefs that structure action (Clemens and Cook, 1999). Institutional research into
the role of legitimization processes in the diffusion and persistence of new organizational practices
similarly builds on a community- level approach to understanding organizational behavior.

New

practices arise and diffuse not only due to technical or efficiency considerations but also through the
development of community-wide regulatory rules, normative standards, and cognitive beliefs
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 1995).
Despite a growing amount of research into the role of institutional processes in the spread of
new organizational practices (Burns and Wholey, 1993; Davis, 1991; Fligstein, 1985; Guler, Guillen,
and Macpherson, 2002; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993; Palmer et al., 1987; Tolbert and Zucker,
1983; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997), some critics argue that empirical research remains unduly
focused on mana gerial cognition as a means of explaining the impact of community norms on
organizational outcomes (Mizruchi and Fein, 1998; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). Existing empirical
research emphasizes the role of “mimetic isomorphism” in explaining the interaction between
organizational behavior and social context. When an activity becomes familiar and routine with
continued use, then managers are more likely to mimic it rather than experiment with new practices
(Aldrich, 1999; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Community- wide processes influence the diffusion of
organizational practices because managers observe and respond to one another as they face everyday
strategic issues.
However, others argue that a focus on managerial cognition and consensus underemphasizes
the way in which coercion and conflict shape social norms (Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; Mizruchi and
Fein, 1998). What is legitimate for managers may not be legitimate for other social actors (Perrow,
1986). Therefore, an examination of the role of managers in constructing their own definitions of
legitimate behavior requires the question: legitimate for whom? These authors argue that audiences
1

and interests beyond those of managers need to be analyzed to understand the way that communities
construct and confer legitimacy in organizational systems (see also Clemens and Cook, 1999; Tolbert
and Zucker, 1996; Fligstein, 1990; Stryker, 2000).
We contribute to a broadening of the scope of institutional analysis by developing and testing a
measure of legitimacy rarely explored in the empirical literature: the degree of opposition to an
organizational practice. Building on existing research, we first examine the presence and impact of
legitimacy from the viewpoint of managers.

We theorize that the greater the preva lence of an

organizational practice within a community, the more likely that managers will choose to use this
practice even if there is no strong economic rationale to support this action (Fligstein, 1985; Tolbert
and Zucker, 1983). However, we also examine the question of legitimacy from the perspective of
workers. We theorize that the prevalence of an organizational practice within a community influences
not only the decision of managers to adopt it, but also the decision of workers to accept or oppose it.
The case we examine is the spread of wage arrears in Russia during the 1990s. Wage arrears,
the late and non-payment of contractual wages to employees, first became substantial in 1993, and the
aggregate stock of overdue wages grew to a total of 50 trillion rubles (around 8 billion dollars U.S.) by
the beginning of 1998 (Goskomstat, 1998). Nearly two-thirds of Russian employees reported they
were owed overdue wages by the end of that year, with an average debt of 4.8 monthly wages per
affected worker (Earle and Sabirianova, 2000). The use of wage arrears in Russia moved beyond an
exceptional practice in times of crisis to represent a routine organizational practice practiced by a large
number of organizations across multiple industries and sectors.
Taking their starting point in the neoclassical economic model of wage adjustment, most prior
studies of the Russian labor market have treated wage arrears as a flexible way for firms to reduce
labor costs (Alfandari and Schaffer, 1996; Desai and Idson, 2000; Gimpelson, 1998; Layard and
Richter, 1994; Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti, 1999; a critique of this approach can be found in
Earle and Sabirianova, 2000 and 2002). The pressure to cut labor costs in Russia has been heavy due
2

to the inherited situa tion of overstaffing, particularly in industrial enterprises, which, emerging from
the constraints and supports of administrative planning, have experienced tremendous shocks to their
product and factor markets. GDP has fallen by about 40 percent, and industrial production has been
cut by over half in the early and mid-1990s (Goskomstat, 1998). Faced with this crisis, firms have
responded by reducing employment, hours of work, real wage rates, and employee benefits as well as
delaying wages. A firm- level consequence of wage arrears – the ability to adjust wages flexibly under
conditions of high uncertainty and difficult economic conditions – is portrayed as the primary causal
explanation of why this practice has diffused so widely in post-communist Russia.
In contrast to the neoclassical perspective that views wage arrears as a flexible contracting
mechanism, we propose and test a theory that examines this practice as a legitimate form of
organizational behavior. The neoclassical perspective starts with the implicit assumption that wage
arrears are legitimate and theorizes about the conditions under which firms will find this strategy most
beneficial. An institutional perspective raises the question of whether, and under what conditions,
wage arrears may become considered as a legitimate organizational practice at all. To examine the
extent to which wage arrears are legitimized in Russia, we move above the level of the firm to look at
characteristics of communities. We theorize that the more that wage arrears are perceived as a
legitimate form of organizational behavior within a community, the more likely it is that firms will use
this practice and the less likely that workers will oppose it.
In the first section of the paper, we review the institutional literature on the relationship
between community norms and the legitimization of new organizational practices. We then develop
hypotheses from both a neoclassical and institutional perspective to explain the use of wage arrears by
firms and the reactions to wage arrears by workers. We test these hypotheses on a dataset developed
through a large survey of Russian agricultural and industrial firms, containing annual information from
1991 to 1999.

3

Our results provide partial support for a neoclassical perspective on the spread of this practice.
We find that better performing firms are less likely to adopt wage arrears than poorly performing firms
and that firms with more liquid resources make less use of the practice than their less liquid
counterparts. The neoclassical perspective, however, is insufficient to explain a number of important
facts about arrears including the existence of substantial numbers of firms that have significant levels
of arrears yet nevertheless display strong growth and excellent liquidity characteristics. According to
the neoclassical model, firm characteristics such as growth in sales and output, rapid hiring, increasing
employment and wages, positive cash flow, and an absence of liquidity difficulties should not be found
in firms with wage arrears, but we find that many such firms do in fact exist. The data also show many
cases of declining firms that have zero arrears, implying that the neoclassical explanation of wage
arrears as solely a mechanism of wage adjustment is insufficient to account for the phenomenon.
Investigating this puzzle from the standpoint of institutional theory, we find powerful
community effects in the diffusion of wage arrears. First, focusing on the set of firms whose behavior
directly contradicts the neoclassical story - those displaying both large arrears and rising employment
and wages - we show that such firms are disproportionately located in localities with high average
levels of arrears. Declining firms are also more likely to have arrears in such areas than they are in
low-arrears localities. This suggests that the choice of arrears is not a function solely of firm-specific
conditions of growth and liquidity, but that the prevalence of arrears in local communities also
influences an individua l firm’s choices.
Second, defining the relevant organizational field as the local community in a multivariate
analysis, we find that the lagged level of local arrears is a strong predictor of firm- level arrears. The
effect of lagged local arrears is large and robust even when controlling for a host of firm
characteristics, including alternative measures of growth, performance, liquidity, and other relevant
covariates. The analysis also includes firm fixed effects to control for any unobserved propensity for
firms to use arrears that may be correlated with lagged local arrears.
4

Third, we investigate worker responses to arrears and find that the propensity of workers to quit
the firm and engage in strikes in response to arrears in their firm is a decreasing function of the level of
local arrears. In communities with low arrears, a firm’s quit rate and strike probability both tend to
increase in the level of their arrears. In areas with high arrears, however, these responses are strongly
attenuated, suggesting that workers are less likely to oppose wage arrears in localities in which the
practice is more widely diffused. The results provide strong evidence that wage arrears have become
institutionalized as a legitimate organizational practice within these communities.

COMMUNITY NORMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICES:
ARE WAGE ARREARS LEGITIMATE?
A common finding in organizational research is that the structure of communities influences
the diffusion and persistence of new organizational practices. Organizational researchers have shown
that orga nizational practices diffuse quickly within industries once a large number of firms adopt the
practice (Davis, 1991; Fligstein, 1985; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993). Parallel findings have
demonstrated that organizational practices spread across industries and regions even if underlying
technical challenges of the industries or regions differ greatly (Burns and Wholey, 1993; Fligstein,
1990; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). Moreover, institutional theories have been used to explain longlasting differences in organizational practices across national boundaries (Gooderharn, Nordhaug, and
Ringda, 1999; Biggart and Guillen, 1999; Guillen, 1994).

Firms within countries are shown to

demonstrate similar patterns of organizational behavior because of their embeddedness in a common
institutional environment (Dore, 1973; Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton, 1991; Hamilton and Biggart,
1988).
Differences in social norms of legitimate behavior are an important explanation of the variation
of organizational practice across communities. Biggart and Guillen (1999) remark that “in some
settings it is ‘normal’ to raise business capital through family ties; in others, this is an ‘inappropriate’
5

imposition and fostering ties to banks or to foreign investors might be a more successful or legitimate
fund-raising strategy. … Cultural and social organization provide not only ideas and values, but also
strategies of action.” From this perspective, organizational practices are viewed as socially legitimized
forms of organizational activity as much as they are technical solutions to economic tasks. Legitimate
organizational practices are “strategies of action” that actors within a social context consider “normal”
and “appropriate” (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Scott 1995; Suchman, 1995). Firms cannot simply pursue
profit-maximizing goals by any available means; instead, they are constrained by social understandings
of what is acceptable behavior.
Some researchers examine the distinction between organizational ends and means by
distinguishing between “symbolic” and “substantive” activity. Firms often adopt socially endorsed
means of activity to mimic or impress other powerful actors within a community but decouple this
ceremonial activity from the substantive task of achieving organizational goals (Westphal, Gulati and
Shortell, 1997; Westphal and Zajac, 1994). However, a number of researchers stress that the impact of
institutional norms should not be seen as contradictory to theories of technical rationality (Dobbin and
Dowd, 1997; Fligstein, 1996). Communities do not dictate the decisions that organizations must take,
but they frame the menu of legitimate “strategies of action” from which organizations are allowed to
choose in pursuing technical goals.1
A comparison of the practice of wage arrears in Russia to norms of on-time payment in other
countries demonstrates the importance of community norms of legitimate behavior in shaping
organizational behavior. Wage arrears are not only much rarer in most economies (including most
post-socialist countries), but also when they do appear, the circumstances tend to be quite special:
small start-up companies facing severe liquidity constraints, bankrupt firms about to be shut down, or
1

Biggart and Hamilton (1992) build upon this argument to argue that neoclassical economic models should not be applied
universally across countries. While these models may correctly describe organizational behavior in western, developed
countries, differences in local norms of legitimate behavior lead organizations in non-western contexts to behave in ways
that often deviate from the predictions of western theory (see also Hamilton and Biggart, 1988).
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occasional situations of fraud. For most firms under most circumstances, the choice of delaying wage
payments is simply not on the table. In the rare cases when arrears do occur, most communities react
to this form of behavior as an abdication of contractual obligations instead of accepting it as a
legitimate firm strategy to facilitate wage adjustment. Social understandings, not economic ones,
provide the boundaries of what is considered to be legitimate behavior.
These boundaries are given not only, or even primarily, by forma l laws and regulations.
Indeed, while the legal systems of most other countries provide no special provisions for wage arrears,
treating them merely as a particular case of contract violations, the Russian Labor Code explicitly
outlaws them. Firms’ use of the practice may be challenged either in the civil courts (when workers
file a lawsuit) or by the Ministry of Labor’s Inspection Service, in the latter case sometimes leading to
criminal court procedures.

The consistent use of wage arrears, despite their illegality, raises the

important distinction between formal law and social meaning in the study of legitimacy: law has
meaning only if it enters into the actions of individuals. The importance of norms of legitimate
behavior in explaining on-time payment in western countries is not simply that late payment is illegal,
but that, in most situations, on-time payment is taken for granted. Western ma nagers do not explicitly
strategize about the costs and benefits of avoiding wage obligations, as if this practice represented a
legitimate option among a menu of strategic choices. Instead, practices are routinely chosen – or
ignored – based on taken- for-granted norms of behavior (March and Olsen, 1989).
The tight alignment between regulatory, normative, and cognitive sources of support for
community norms in western contexts often makes it difficult to untangle the various processes by
which organizational practices become legitimized. Much of recent U.S. research into diffusion
processes examines orga nizational practices that eventually became viewed as normative best practice
among professionals, professional organizations, or the state: for example, civil bureaucracy (Tolbert
and Zucker, 1983), the multi-divisional form (Fligstein, 1985; Palmer, et al., 1987; Palmer, Jennings,
and Zhou,1993), total quality management (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell, 1997), the matrix
7

organization (Burns and Wholey, 1993) and ISO 9000 quality standards (Guler, Guillen, and
Macpherson, 2002). The eventual normative endorsement of these practices makes it difficult to
distinguish between alternative institutional explanations of why legitimacy influences the spread of an
organizational practice: because a powerful actor such as the state has imposed the practice upon other
organizations; because it has become normatively accepted as best-practice among a group of
professionals; or because managers have simply adopted typified models of organizational behavior
under conditions of uncertainty.
The case of Russian wage arrears offers an extraordinary setting for examining the construction
and maintenance of community norms of legitimate behavior because, in contrast to the examples in
the existing literature, regulatory, normative, and cognitive legitimization mechanisms operate at crosspurposes.

Not only are wage arrears illegal in Russia, but they are also frequently normatively

condemned. Public opinion data research has demonstrated that Russian workers consistently place
the problem of wage arrears as one of the fundamental problems facing the country (Javeline, 2003).
Russian politicians similarly rail against the practice.

President Yeltsin, for example, cited the

continuation of wage arrears as justification for firing multiple government officials in 1996 (McFaul,
2001). The wage arrears case thus presents an important theoretical question for institutional research:
can an activity that is frequently used, but illegal and normatively condemned, still be considered a
“legitimate” organizational practice?
An answer to this question depends, first of all, on how legitimacy is defined. By regulatory or
normative criteria, wage arrears can easily be identified as “illegitimate.” However, organizational
theorists emphasize that a cognitive definition of legitimacy refers to the extent to which a practice is
considered “appropriate” or “normal” by the actors within a broader community (Suchman, 1995).
The construction of legitimacy, in this case, has little to do with formal prescriptions of expressed
norms of good conduc t within a community, such as that found in legal or professional standards.
Instead, legitimacy reflects informal understandings of what are perceived as accepted ways of
8

conducting business within a community.

By these criteria, the argument that wage arrears are

legitimate in Russia remains a plausible hypothesis. Although wage arrears may be illegal, they are
nevertheless used frequently in everyday business activity.
Institutional theory in organizational research provides an important theoretical perspective to
understand the way in which the legitimization of an organizational practice may take place outside the
scope of the law. Organizational researchers theorize that the legitimization of an organizational
practice takes place, at a minimum, in a two-stage process (Tolbert and Zucker; 1983; Fligstein, 1985).
In the first stage, organizations, often for transactional or efficiency reasons, adopt a new
organizational practice. However, as more firms within a community adopt an activity, it becomes
increasingly legitimized as an accepted form of organizational behavior within a community. Once
legitimized, the social forces supporting an organizational activity as a collective norm of behavior
help to explain the continued persistence of the practice, even if original economic functions dissipate.
From this perspective, legitimate norms of behavior are not simply imposed on managers by
more powerful organizations such as the state or professional organizations.

Instead, managers

themselves are participants in the construction of the commonly accepted standards of behavior under
which they operate. A firm’s adoption of a new activity has consequences not only for the firm itself,
but also for the community as a whole.
The existing empirical literature emphasizes the role of managerial cognition in explaining the
connection between firm strategy and collective outcomes.

The underlying argument is that the

decisions of managers are not made independently of the actions of other organizations. Instead,
managers observe and respond to other managers when facing difficult and uncertain decisions.
Therefore, an important consequence of the increasing adoption of a new practice by a large number of
organizations is that it increases the availability and appropriateness of that activity in the minds of
managers. Organizational theorists have built upon this insight to demonstrate that managers are more
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likely to adopt a practice or strategy if they have had contact with other managers who have adopted a
similar activity (Haunschild, 1993; Haverman, 1993; Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou, 1993).
Critics of this approach, however, argue that the role of managerial action in the construction of
new social norms involves conflict as well as cognition. Stryker (2000) argues that institutional
politics between multiple stakeholders explains the way in which communities construct and maintain
collective norms of legitimate behavior. Fligstein (1990: 6) makes a similar argument about the role of
power and politics in the construction of collective norms and beliefs. He posits that actors within a
common field of activity “share a similar conception of legitimate action.” However, he suggests that
organizational fields “are set up to benefit their most powerful actors.” From this perspective, an
analysis of only managerial beliefs and actions is insufficient to understand the causes and
consequences of legitimacy. Instead, multiple audiences and interests need to be examined in order to
understand the processes by which communities construct and confer legitimacy in organizational
systems (see also Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1997; Mizruchi and Fein, 1998; Perrow, 1986; Tolbert and
Zucker, 1996).
The call to include multiple audiences and competing interests in the construction of legitimacy
is particularly important in the case of wage arrears in Russia. Despite their negative consequences for
at least one set of community stakeholders in Russia, wage arrears nevertheless spread widely in
Russia during the 1990s. The role of workers in supporting, or suppressing, the diffusion of wage
arrears during this time period represents an important issue in understanding the forces leading to the
widespread prevalence of this practice.
In the following sections, we develop hypotheses from both a neoclassical and an institutional
perspective to address questions of both employee and employer behavior in relationship to wage
arrears practices. The neoclassical model assumes that using wage arrears is an appropriate strategy of
action functionally equivalent to cutting wages and proceeds to investigate the conditions, such as
negative demand shocks or poor liquidity, that might make the strategy most efficient at the level of
10

the firm. In contrast, the institutional argument ident ifies the role of community-wide legitimacy as an
important factor in the spread of new practices.

From this perspective, the degree to which

communities consider an organizational practice to be legitimate should influence the diffusion and
maintenance of the practice, independently of whether it is efficient for individual organizations. We
theorize that the more that the practice of wage areas is legitimized as an appropriate way of
conducting business within a community, then the more likely that mana gers will use this practice and
the less likely employees will oppose it through actions such as quitting (exit) and striking (voice).

The Neoclassical Model: Wage Arrears as Flexible Contracts
The neoclassical wage adjustment model explains wage arrears as a flexible way for firms to
cut wages in response to negative demand shocks. The argument can be illustrated with the aid of a
simple supply and demand model. In the hypothetical initial situation shown in Figure 1, the market
for a particular type of labor services clears at effective wage rate W1 and quantity (employment) level
L1 , the point where the labor supply (S) and labor demand (D) functions intersect. At this initial
equilibrium there is no unemployment (U=0).
*** Insert Figure 1 Here***
Starting from this situation, a negative shock to a firm’s product demand results in a downward
shift in its labor demand function, shown in the figure as the movement to D', because the demand for
labor is “derived” from the demand for the firm’s product. If the wage is assumed to be completely
flexible, it would fall to W*, and a new equilibrium would be reached at emplo yment level L*, again
with zero unemployment. In the case where the wage is “sticky” or “rigid” in a downward direction,
however, unemployment rises. Referring to the figure, the wage fails to adjust and remains at W1 , employment falls to L2 , while unemployment rises to U1 = L2 – L1 . Intermediate cases exist whereby the
effective wage adjusts only partially to some level between W1 and W*, and employment falls to some
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level between L2 and L*. The degree of flexibility is indexed by the elasticity of wage response to the
demand shock.
This model attributes unemployment to wage stickiness, and therefore any device that increases
wage flexibility can be viewed as a virtue. Following this logic, wage arrears have attracted some
explicit praise for their contribution to the “Russian way of labor adjustment.” Layard and Richter
(1994), for instance, portray wage arrears as a form of “wage flexibility... explained by the willingness
of workers to accept pay cuts in order to preserve jobs.” In its 1995 survey of the Russian economy,
the OECD (1995) applauded the “remarkable flexibility...of real wages” and the use of “wage
arrears...to finance this employment surplus.”
According to this perspective, wage arrears even have a number of advantages over more
conventional wage contracts. Employers do not need to negotiate the effective wage reductions with
employees: unlike a contractual wage cut, no transaction costs are incurred in a lengthy and uncertain
renegotiation process, as wage arrears are decided by the firm unilaterally. Wage arrears provide firms
with an adjustment mechanism that has very low implementation costs.
The neoclassical perspective that views wage arrears as an efficient response to negative
demand shocks suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Declining firms are more likely to engage in wage arrears practices than
expanding firms.
The neoclassical hypothesis about the importance of transactional flexibility in explaining wage arrears
practices would be difficult to reconcile with the presence of substantial arrears in firms that are hiring,
expanding employment and sales, or raising wage rates.
A closely related argument stresses the role of wage arrears in alleviating the liquidity problems
associated with demand shocks. Some economists have suggested that wage arrears are similar to a
loan from the workers to enable the company to pay other obligations, thus to survive (Alfandari and
Schaffer, 1996). Manifestations of illiquidity in transitional Russia have included not only arrears in
12

wage payments but also in interfirm relationships, bank debt, and taxes. Moreover, an extensive
system of barter has emerged, with estimates of the share of non-cash receipts reaching more than 60
percent of sales in the late 1990s (OECD, 2000). This “demonetization” of the Russian economy
(Clarke, 1998) may have led to wage arrears, suggesting the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Firms with lower liquidity will be more likely to engage in wage arrears
practices than firms with higher liquidity.
The presence of arrears in firms with good liquidity as indicated by high profitability, low levels of
payment arrears to and from other firms, and low levels of barter rather than cash payments would be
difficult to explain from the neo-classical perspective.
Savings to the firm are equivalent with costs to the workers, of course. Why would workers
have agreed to such large effective real wage reductions? The answer from the standard neoclassical
paradigm is that they traded wages for continued emplo yment. From this perspective, we can extend
our hypotheses beyond firm behavior to also examine worker behavior. We consider two types of
worker reactions to wage arrears: quits and strikes.
The neoclassical model of worker mobility focuses on the response of quits to wages, and a
fundamental implication of the model is that quits rise in response to a decrease in wages, as workers
search for better opportunities. This hypothesis has been corroborated by a number of empirical
studies (Pencavel, 1972; Topel and Ward, 1992; Farber, 1994, 1999). Assuming that wage arrears are
equivalent to wage cuts, we therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: Firms with higher wage arrears will have higher employee turnover than firms
with lower amounts of wage arrears.
Neoclassical research on strike behavior similarly treats wages as a fundamental determinant of
the propensity to strike, with a hypothesized negative relationship (see, e.g., Kennan, 1986). Again,
assuming that workers react to wage arrears the same way they do to wage cuts, we hypothesize that:
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Hypothesis 4: Firms with higher wage arrears will have a higher number of strikes than firms
with lower amounts of wage arrears.
Institutional Model: Wage Arrears as Legitimate Practices
Institutional theories in diffusion studies do not necessarily oppose market efficiency
explanations of why a certain number of firms initially adopt a particular organizational practice or
structure. Instead, this perspective suggests that once an initial number of firms adopt a particular
practice, then the eventual diffusion and reproduction of the practice can no longer be explained solely
through its economic benefits. As an organizational practice becomes accepted as a legitimate form of
behavior, the more likely it is to diffuse within an organizational field, even if its original economic
functions dissipate (Fligstein, 1985; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).
Much of the existing organizational research into diffusion processes identifies the industry as
the meaningful organizational field within which legitimization processes operate (Davis, 1991;
Fligstein, 1985; Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 1993; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal, Gulati, and
Shortell 1997).

In the Russian case, the practice of wage arrears has diffused across industries.

Therefore, we must first identify the appropriate organizational field before we can hypothesize about
how variation in the field may influence the adoption decisions of individual firms. For the purposes
of this research, we use the unit of community defined as the raion (county) as the boundaries of the
organizational field around which we develop our hypotheses.

Russian raions are distinct

administrative units, and studies have shown that the labor market tends to be highly local in Russia, as
geographic mobility is difficult (see, e.g., Mitchneck and Plane, 1995).

We will use the words

“locality” and “community” interchangeably to refer to this unit of analysis.
Similar to research that uses the degree of adoption of an organizational practice within an
industry as an indicator that a practice is legitimized, we use the cumulative past adoption of wage
arrears within a raion as an indicator of the degree to which a practice is legitimized within a Russian
community. We hypothesize that an important effect of the increasing usage of wage arrears within a
14

community is that firms will be more likely to engage in this practice, independently of the economic
performance or liquidity of the firm:
Hypothesis 5: Independent of firm performance and liquidity, firms operating in communities
with a higher prevalence of wage arrears will be more likely to engage in wage arrears
practices than firms operating in communities with a lower prevalence of arrears.
Existing research emphasizes the effect of community-wide adoption of an organizational practice on
the construction of collective knowledge and understanding about a new activity. Managers, however,
do not benefit only from increased technical knowledge about a new innovation as it diffuses. They
also learn the extent to which other stakeholders will contest the implementation of a new practice. 2 In
the case of wage arrears, managers are not only looking at other managers as they learn about a new
practice; they are also learning about the possible reactions of their actions by other social actors such
as the state and workers. The passive acquiescence to a new activity by some community actors may
be more important to managers than the active endorsement of the practice (Suchman, 1995). The
cumulative adoption of a practice within a community therefore provides an important signal to
managers that a practice is considered a legitimate form of organizational practice that can be used
with few adverse consequences.
Further analysis of the reaction of other community actors to the practice of wage arrears leads
us to focus on behavior of employees, the group of stakeholders most prominently affected by arrears.
We theorize that managerial action influences the construction of community norms not only through
its effect on managerial cognition, but also through its effect on workers’ beliefs and opportunities.
One mechanism through which community norms influence worker behavior is the creation of
collective beliefs about what is considered acceptable and normal behavior. Equity theory research
2

Aldrich and Fiol (1994) distinguish between “cognitive” and “socio-political” legitimacy, but the socio-political
environment itself may have a cognitive component. Managerial beliefs about such issues as the impact of law or the
possibility of strikes influence the way in which organizations shape, and are shaped by, the socio-political environment.
See Edelman (1990) and Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger (1999) for examples of the role of managers in constructing social
meanings of legal regulation in the United States context.
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into employee attitudes of pay fairness and job satisfaction demonstrates that employees compare their
own experiences with relevant reference groups when judging their own situation (Dornstein, 1989;
Kulik and Ambrose, 1992; Mowday, 1991). Moreover, individuals’ assessment of their relative wellbeing is “influenced disproportionately by the vividness of the information that they have about others
with whom they come in direct contact” (Frank 1985: 30). The widespread use of an organizational
practice within a community will thereby increase its “normality” through the construction of a
dominant standard shared by workers across multiple organizations. If the majority of people with
whom workers come into contact experience wage arrears, then the less likely that any individual
worker will consider his or her own experience to be outside the norm of accepted behavior.
Moreover, another important effect of a community standard of organizational behavior is that
it decreases the opportunities of workers to find alternative employment, even if they so desired.
Workers not only have few opportunities to change their situation, but, if they do leave the firm, they
often lose the back wages due them from previous months worked. Widespread wage arrears in
workers’ local environments, in this case, decrease the incentives of workers to quit a firm that engages
in this practice.
We apply the same measure of legitimacy used to examine the level of wage arrears used in
firms – the degree of prevalence of a practice within a community – to examine worker reactions to the
practice. We first hypothesize that the greater the extent of wage arrears within a community, then the
lower the probability that workers in that community will quit a firm that engages in this practice:
Hypothesis 6: The extent of wage arrears within a community will moderate the effect of firmlevel wage arrears on employee turnover.
The role of community standards in defining what is considered “acceptable” and “normal”
organizational behavior, combined with the lack of opportunities for workers to find alternative forms
of employment in communities with a high prevalence of arrears, suggests that community norms
toward the practice of wage arrears will have an independent effect on employee quitting behavior.
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While quitting is a form of exit, workers may also respond to wage arrears through voice
(Hirschman, 1970). Our second measure of worker opposition relates to the propensity of employees
to strike within a community.

A number of researchers highlight the absence of collective

mobilization as an important indicator of a legitimized practice. Jepperson (1991: 145) suggests that
institutionalized practices “owe their survival to relatively self-activating social processes.

Their

persistence is not dependent notably, upon recurrent collective mobilization....” Clemens and Cook
(1999: 445) make a similar point about the absence of collective mobilization as a defining feature of
institutions when they write that institutionalized procedures pattern the actions of individuals and
organization “without requiring repeated collective mobilization or authoritative intervention to
achieve these regularities.” Tolbert and Zucker (1996) similarly suggest that “relatively low resistance
by opposing groups” is an important indicator of the degree of institutionalization of an organiza tional
practice. 3
The relationship between the legitimization of a practice and the absence of collective
mobilization is particularly applicable to the study of worker protest movements. Piven and Cloward
(1977) point out that absolute or relative deprivation is not sufficient to explain worker movements.
Instead, they emphasize that the “the social arrangements that are perceived as just and immutable
must become to be seen as injust and mutable” before collective action is initiated (Piven and Cloward,
1977: 12). The continued adoption of an organizational practice within a community may transform
the nature of what is consider to be “just,” as a lack of alternative models may transform the normative
environment in which workers operate. Just as importantly, however, the continued use of a practice
within a community may transform beliefs about the relative permanence of a practice, i.e., what is
“mutable.” The continued use of a practice over a long period of time reinforces a belief that there is

3

We use the concept of legitimization similarly to the way these authors use the concept of institutionalization. We focus
on the cognitive acceptance of a practice as “normal” or “appropriate” without any assumptions that these beliefs represent
a consensus on the ethical, legal, or technical merits of a particular practice.
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little recourse for actors to engage in efforts to change it (see Suchman, 1995: 582-584).

We

hypothesize that the greater the prevalence of wage arrears within a community, the less likely that
workers will strike against this practice:
Hypothesis 7: The extent of wage arrears within a community will moderate the effect of firmlevel wage arrears on employee strikes.
Organizational researchers emphasize that strategic actors respond to the norms in the broader
environment not only because they value or believe in these practices, but also because they become
“experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external
and coercive fact” (Berger and Luckman, 1966: 58, cited in Tolbert and Zucker, 1996). The belief in
the “exteriority” of social practices as beyond the ability to change leads strategic actors to accept
social norms as a stable component of the way the world is, even if that practice does not match a
normative perception of the way the world should be (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Zucker, 1977).
While much of organizational theory has applied this argument to managerial actions, an application to
employee action also provides a relevant method to explore the impact of social constructions of
legitimacy. Community norms influence behavior through the creation of incentives and values that
drive individual decisions about what is profitable and possible in the present institutional context as
well as through the construction of collective beliefs about the possibility for future changes to existing
rule structures.

DATA AND METHODS
The firm- level data that we study in this paper were collected to provide precise measures of
wage arrears, growth, liquidity, labor, strikes, and tur nover at the firm level for the period from 1991 to
1999. The data were collected during 2000 and 2001 as part of a larger study of Russian firms.
Whenever possible, the variables we study in this paper are based on standard enterprise accounting
information (precise line numbers from the Goskomstat, the Russian State Statistical Committee ,
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reporting forms), not on managerial interviews. The data from the responses to this questionnaire were
also linked to other data sources (Goskomstat industrial and agricultural registries and balance sheets)
to supplement and further check the provided information. If particular data could not be reconstructed
through past recording records, interviewers then asked managers to answer a survey of the frequency
of events or practices for each year. We describe below our sample, research design, and specific
operationalizations of the variables of interest.
Sample
The sample of industrial and agricultural firms was based on all industrial and agricultural
employers of the employee-respondents to a nationwide household survey, the Russian Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The sampling for the RLMS involved regional stratification across 50
raions within 32 Russian oblasts, with the probability of selection proportional to population (except
for the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, which were taken as self-representing). Household
addresseses were randomly selected for interviewing within the geographical sampling units. Thus,
conditional on the same community stratification procedure, the firms in our sample constitute a
national probability sample of industrial employers, with selection probability proportional to
employment size. 4
Unlike most surveys of firms, our procedure did not replace nonresponding firms with other
observations, and interviewers expended great efforts to include every firm on their sample lists. As a
result of this procedure, the response rate was approximately 64 percent among industrial firms (522
firms) and 73% among agricultural firms (75 firms). The regional and sectoral shares match those in
the official statistics reasonably well, as shown in Biletsky et al. (2003). Response rates did not differ
4

To be precise, the RLMS involves a two-stage geographic stratification procedure followed by random drawing of
households (residences); thus the probability for any household i to appear in the sample S i is Pr(i∈ S i ) = Pr(i∈ U1 )*Pr(i∈
U2 |U2 ⊂U1 )*s/n 2 , where U1 is the set of primary sampling units, U2 is the set of secondary sampling units, s is the sample
size, and n 2 is the total number of households in U2 . The probability that employer j is included in our firm sample S j is
then simply the joint probability equal to Pr(i∈S i )*Pr(i contains an employee of j), if the distribution of employment across
households is independent of the conditional probability of selecting i. The property of independence holds in the RLMS,
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between the large firms in the government registries of enterprises and smaller firms that do not appear
in the registry, so there is no evidence of size-related bias.
In total, the sample of firms, conditioned on a non- missing wage arrears variable (since this is
necessary at each step in the analysis) is 560 firms, of which 486 come from the industrial firm survey
and 74 from the agricultural firm survey.

Firms interviewed before early 2000 did not provide

information on 1999, as their accounts were not yet ready. The agricultural firm survey also includes
information only through 1998.
Dependent Variables
Firm Wage Arrears (W).

The standard measure of wage arrears in Russia – whether in

individual firm balance sheets, in official Russian statistics or the minds of workers – is the stock of
wages that is overdue (Earle and Sabirianova, 2002). The usual way managers express the overdue
balance for their firms is in terms of monthly wage bills (payrolls). Thus, in our own interviews with
managers, conducted when we were designing the data collection instrument, a common type of
answer to a question about arrears would be, for example, “No, we don’t have this problem very much.
Only one month.” In other cases, they might say, “Yes, unfortunately our firm, like most of those
around here, has had some difficulties. Now we owe five months.”
Our data collection instrument measured this stock of wage arrears for each year, which we
label W, using two different methods:

first, by dividing the line item for wage arrears on the

Goskomstat accounting balance sheet by the annual wage bill, and, second, by asking managers
directly to report the number of overdue monthly wage bills for each year. The respondent for the
former question was the accounting department, which keeps balance sheet data, while for the latter
question it was a top manager. The two measures are extremely highly correlated, but the calculation
based on accounting information requires information on the annual wage bill, which is frequently

since the final drawing is random and therefore equal for all n 2 households.
information on the RLMS sampling procedure.
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See Swafford et al. (1997) for more

unavailable, particularly in the agricultural firm data, thus restricting the size of the sample for
analysis. Therefore, our analysis in this paper is based on managerial reports.
Worker Quits (Q) and Strikes (S). Quit rates (Q) for each year were calculated by dividing total
voluntary separations by average employment for the corresponding year. These data were obtained
from annual employment reports to the Goskomstat (the “P-4 form” in recent years), and again the
precise line numbers were specified in our data collection instrument. The incidence of strikes (a
dummy variable, S) was measured through survey questions to top managers on whether work protests
had occurred at the firm, including not only conventional work stoppages but also in a few cases
hunger strikes, demonstrations, slowdowns, and other actions. The survey also asked for the main
motivation for the protest, and it is interesting to note that more than 90 percent of the responses
reported wage arrears as the cause; this variable is therefore very appropriate for our purposes.
Independent Variables
Firm Growth (G) and Liquidity (L). We collected multiple measures of both firm growth and
liquidity. One set of growth measures relates to performance of the firm in general: output growth,
sales growth, and profitability. The second set of measures re lates more directly to labor market
behavior: growth in employment, real wages, nominal wages, and the hiring rate. Other growth
proxies include the hiring rate and whether the firm received patents on any innovations. All these
variables are represented with the notation G. Liquidity measures (L) include profitability (which
could also be viewed as a performance measure), frozen bank account in response to nonpayment of
debts (kartoteka), barter in payments for inputs and outputs, and overdue receivables and payables.
Changes in these variables are calculated for each year in which the data were collected.
Community Wage Arrears (O). As already mentioned, firms were sampled within 50 raions of
Russia. The measure of the regional wage arrears norm is defined for each firm- year separately, as the
average stock of wage arrears among the sampled agricultural and industrial firms in the firm’s raion
in the previous year.
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Control Variables
We include industry indicators to proxy both for demand conditions and for differences in
technology that may increase the propensity of firms to use wage arrears and of workers to strike and
quit (for instance, due to differences in skill specificity). We similarly include a location code for
whether a firm is located in a capital city, other city, or a non-city, the rationale being that workers’
reactions to late wage payments may be influenced by their outside options in the local labor market.
In general, the larger the urban area, the greater the number of outside options workers may be
expected to have. Unionization is included because unions may resist arrears, although some observers
believe that Russian unions have had little influence on labor market outcomes (e.g., Gimpelson and
Lippoldt, 2001; Kapeliushnikov, 2001). Fringe benefits may also affect worker behavior, particularly
their tendency to quit (Layard and Richter, 1995) and strike, while the measure of initial training costs
captures the firm’s costs of adjustment in replacing workers who quit. Because training costs are
missing in about 10 percent of the cases, we impute the mean and include a control for nonreporting in
some of the regressions.
Summary Statistics
Table 1 shows the results from analyzing our survey data on the incidence and magnitude of the
stock of wage arrears (W) by year from 1991 to 1999. Consistent with other sources, the data show a
negligible level of arrears in 1992, followed by a rapid increase. By 1998, about 60 percent of firms
reported they had overdue wage debts, with an average of 4.3 monthly wage bills of overdue debt
among affected firms. While there were relatively few with just a single monthly wage bill of arrears,
more than 25 percent reported arrears exceeding 4 months. Thus, our data correspond well to other
information on wage arrears in Russia (see Earle and Sabirianova, 2002).
***INSERT TABLE 1 HERE***
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Table 2 presents the characteristics of the total sample in 1998. 5 Together with the control
variables (industry, hiring rate, etc.), the table also shows our alternative measures of growth (denoted
as G): sales, output, real and nominal wages, and employment. Other growth proxies include the
hiring rate and whether the firm received patents on any innovations.

The magnitudes of these

variables are very similar to what can be found in other studies of the Russian economy and labor
markets (OECD, 2000; Kapeliushnikov, 2001). Finally, the table also shows the mean and standard
deviation of our worker response measures, strikes (S) and quits (Q). Only about 5.5 percent of
organizations experienced a strike in 1998, although again it is notable that nearly all of them
attributed the incident to wage arrears. The quit rate, at 19.8 percent, is very similar to other reported
figures (e.g., Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001; Kapeliushnikov, 2001).
***INSERT TABLE 2 HERE***
Analysis
Level of Firm Wage Arrears . Our analysis of neo-classical Hypotheses 1 and 2 and the institutional
Hypothesis 5 includes both bivariate and multivariate regression analysis. Given that most previous
research has focused on the neoclassical explanation for arrears, we focus initial attention on
investigating whether the data are roughly consistent with the adjustment and liquidity hypotheses
through a bivariate examination of the extent to which wage arrears coincide with decline and
illiquidity in our sample firms. This type of analysis is particularly valuable for identifying exceptions
to a given theory: cases that do not seem to fit. Next, we analyze whether those firms that appear to
violate the neoclassical argument (those that display liquidity and growth yet nonetheless have arrears)
are more likely to be found in regions of high wage arrears (as would be predicted by the institutional
argument). The hypotheses are then tested against each other in a multivariate regression framework
that controls for other variables and for unobservable factors that may be correlated with arrears.

5

As noted above, the sample is smaller in 1999, so 1998 is the last year with a relatively full sample in the database. The
time-varying characteris tics are qualitatively similar in other years, however.
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Bivariate Cross-Sectional Analysis. Beginning with Hypothesis 1 and 2, we implement some simple
binary tests for data from one year of our dataset, 1998. 6 The neoclassical Hypothesis 1 that declining
firms have higher expected wage arrears than expanding firms can be expressed as E(Wi |G i<0) >
E(Wi |G i>0), where Wi is the stock of wage arrears, Gi is a measure of growth, and subscript i indexes
firms. Similarly, a simple binary version of Hypothesis 2 that illiquid firms have higher wage arrears
than expanding firms can be expressed as E(Wi |Li=0) > E(Wi |Li>0), where Li is a measure of liquidity.
If the neoclassical position is sufficient to explain the level of wage arrears in a firm, then the
data should show no cases of firms using wage arrears and also engaged in simultaneously expanding
sales, output, employment, and wage rates. This can be expressed as E(Wi|Gi>0) = 0. Similarly, no
liquid firm should have arrears: E(Wi|Li>0) = 0.
To further examine the sufficiency of the wage adjustment explanation of arrears, we
investigate whether wage arrears are present in a group of firms we label as the “best firms,” those
showing the strongest growth. In particular, we define the best firms as growing firms occupying the
topmost quartile in the positive part of the growth distribution, so that Gi > Gi+.75, where Gi+.75 is the
75th percentile of the growth distribution truncated at Gi = 0. Again, the neoclassical model implies the
hypothesis E(Wi |Gi>Gi+75) = 0, which we may test with our data. Our reasoning is that finding arrears
in these best firms, which not only are not contracting but are actively expanding, would be a strong,
direct contradiction of the neoclassical adjustment view.

With respect to profitability, our only

continuous measure of liquidity, we also consider a group of best firms in the top quartile in the
positive part of the profitability distribution, measuring the extent to which the data contain substantial
numbers of firms that have cash flow that is not only positive but excellent and, nonetheless, have
wage arrears.

6

The choice of this year is arbitrary, and results for other years are quite similar.
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The institutional perspective predicts that the neoclassical account will not only be insufficient
to explain the adoption of a new organizational practice, but also that deviations from the neoclassical
predictions should depend on the strength of the institutionalized norm in the broader environment. To
provide a first test of Hypothesis 5, we therefore predict that deviations from the neoclassical
adjustment perspective will be more likely in re gions with a higher prevalence of wage arrears.
Defining Oi as the raion- level average of W, for all firms in the same raion as i, we consider two
categories of locations: Oi > Omed and Oi < Omed , where Omed is the median of Oi, thus defining the high
and low-arrears raions around this median.

The relevant test of Hypothesis 5 is then that the

probability of finding growing firms with wage arrears is higher in high-arrears regions, thus that
Prob(Oi > Omed | Gi>0, Wi > 0) > Prob(Oi < Omed | Gi>0, Wi > 0). Similarly, growing firms without
arrears are more likely to be found in the low-arrears regions, so that Prob(Oi < Omed | Gi>0, Wi = 0) >
Prob(Oi > Omed | Gi>0, Wi = 0). Analogous arguments can be made with respect to liquidity: high
liquidity firms with arrears should be found in high-arrears regions, and high liquidity firms with no
arrears should be found in low-arrears regions, according to Hypothesis 5.
Multivariate Panel Regression. The bivariate analysis described above does not take into account the
possibility that other variables, observable and unobservable, may also affect firms’ arrears decisions.
If these variables are also correlated with the performance and local arrears measures, then the
bivariate analysis would yield biased and inconsistent estimates of the coefficients of interest. We
therefore make use of a rich set of firm characteristics in the data to control for observables and exploit
panel data techniques to control for unobserved heterogeneity in estimating the feedback from arrears
in the community to arrears in the firm. We estimate the effect of the potential determinants of arrears
in a multivariate panel regression as follows:
Wit = β‘Xit + γΩ it-1 + δ1Git + δ 2Lit + αt + uit,
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so that Wit = wage arrears of firm i in year t, Xit is the set of controls discussed with refe rence to Table
1, Ω it-1 is the lagged regional level of arrears, Git is a measure of firm growth, and Lit is a measure of
firm liquidity. The α t are year dummies, the β, γ, δ1 , and δ 2 are parameters to be estimated, and the uit
reflect the influence of unobserved factors on wage arrears.
A first test of the multivariate model maintains the assumption of a zero conditional mean of
the uit, estimating with pooled ordinary least squares (OLS). While we believe this is a useful starting
point, one potential problem with these results could arise if there is some unobservable wage arrears
effect that is correlated with Ω it-1 . Suppose, for example, that firms tend to cluster regionally, such that
firms with a high unobserved “propensity to have arrears” tend to be found near each other. This
propensity will be positively correlated with both Wit and Ω it, imparting an upward bias to the
estimated γ. A second type of model exploits our panel data to control for this correlated effect. We
decompose the error term uit =α i + ε it, where α i reflects this propensity (and other unobserved fixed
factors). We used a firm fixed effect model to implement this estimation.
Worker Reactions
To test the neo-classical Hypotheses 3 and 4 and the institutional Hypotheses 6 and 7, we
estimate the effect of firm- level arrears and their interaction with average community arrears on
worker responses through voice (incidence of strikes and protests, S) and exit (quit rate, Q). We
specify the following equations:
Qit = ϕ1 Wit-1 + ϕ2Ω it-1 + ϕ12 Wit-1 *Ω it-1 + η‘Xit + α2i + α2t + wit
Prob(Sit = 1) = F(φ 1 Wit-1 + φ 2Ω it-1 + φ12 Wit-1 *Ω it-1 + θ‘Xit + α1t + v it),
where F is the cumulative normal distribution function, so that the strike probability equation is
estimated as a probit, and other variables are defined as before. Hypotheses 3 and 4 concern the direct
effect of wage arrears on quit and strike behavior, implying that ϕ1 and φ 1 are both > 0, as both types of
responses are increasing in arrears. The critical parameters in these equations for Hypotheses 6 and 7
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are the coefficients on the interaction Wit-1 *Ω it-1 . According to Hypothesis 6, ϕ12 < 0, as local wage
arrears attenuate the effect of a firm’s arrears on the extent to which workers react through strikes and
protests. According to Hypothesis 7, φ 12 < 0 as the propensity of a firm’s workers to strike in response
to their own arrears is reduced by the presence of arrears in their region.

Again, we use panel

regression to test this model against the data.

RESULTS
Level of Wage Arrears
Bivariate Analysis.

The results of our initial bivariate analysis are presented in Table 3, which

contains E(Wi|G i<0), E(Wi|G i>0), E(Wi |G i > Gi+.75 ), standard errors for these estimates of the means,
significance levels for the difference of the means from zero, and t- tests for the difference of means
E(Wi |G i<0) – E(Wi|G i>0). 7 Taking for example growth as measured by increasing nominal wage rates,
the mean level of arrears among firms raising their wages is 2.27 monthly wage bills, and it is 3.39
among those decreasing their nominal wages. The results provide some support for the neoclassical
hypotheses, in that E(Wi |G i<0) > E(Wi|G i>0) and E(Wi|Li<0) > E(Wi |Li>0) for most of the variables –
that is, for 11 of the 13 measures we investigate. But the difference is frequently small, and it is
statistically significantly different from zero for only 7 measures.
***INSERT TABLE 3 HERE***
Moreover, average wage arrears are significantly greater than zero at the 1 percent level for
both growing and declining firms and for both liquid and illiquid firms, regardless of how we measure
firm growth and liquidity. Arrears are substantial even among the “best firms,” those among the top
quartile of the growing and liquid firms in the sample; for example, the mean arrears among the 70
firms in the top quartile of those increasing nominal wages was 2.587 monthly wage bills. These

7

The results are presented for a single year, 1998, but as noted above we have computed this table for other years and
obtained qualitatively similar results, which are available on request.
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results provide a prima facie case against the neoclassical view, as they suggest there are many firms
with wage arrears that are not accounted for by considerations of adjustment and illiquidity.
Can an institutional perspective help explain the presence of arrears in well-performing firms?
Our first test of Hypothesis 5 examines whether suc h firms tend to be located disproportionately in
communities with high arrears, defined as exceeding the median across all communities. The results
are contained in Table 4, which shows Prob(Oi >Omed |Gi, Wi) for alternative measures of firm growth
and liquidity and for firms with and without arrears, separately, again for 1998. Focusing first on the
final column of the table, we find that the incidence of expanding firms with arrears is much higher in
localities with above- median average arrears than in those with low arrears; for example, with respect
to real wage growth, the table shows that 75 percent of firms that both use wage arrears and increase
their real wages are located in high-arrears localities. Indeed, for every growth and liquidity measure
the probability exceeds 50 percent, and for most measures the probability is substantially higher.
***INSERT TABLE 4 HERE***
The table also shows that the incidence of high growth firms with no arrears is highest in lowarrears regions. Taking real wage growth again as the example, only 29.6 percent of firms that do not
use arrears and raise their real wages are located in localities with arrears above the median; thus, 70.4
percent of such firms are found in below- median arrears communities.
Table 4 also provides evidence on the issue of declining firms: a substantial number of these
have no arrears whatsoever. For example, 119 firms in the sample are reducing real wages but do not
use arrears. The table demonstrates, moreover, that declining firms with no arrears are much more
likely to be found in low-arrears communities; only 36.1 percent of firms that lower their real wages
but do not use arrears are found in the high-arrears communities, and the remaining 63.9 percent are in
low-arrears communities. Conversely, declining firms using arrears tend to be located in communities
with high arrears.
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The evidence so far suggests that while economic decline and illiquidity are positively
associated with arrears, as predicted by the neoclassical model, the data also show many firms that do
not conform with the model, both growing firms that exhibit arrears and declining firms that do not.
Moreover, these many exceptions appear to vary systematically by location: the growing firms with
arrears are found in high-arrears communities, and the declining firms with no arrears are found in
low-arrears communities. This suggests that there are strong community effects independent of the
economic variables that are the focus of the neoclassical model.
Multivariate Analysis. Table 5 presents the first set of results in a multivariate framework, based on
pooled OLS and fixed effects estimations.

In the specification shown, the growth and liquidity

characteristics of firms are proxied by the annual growth rate of sales and nominal wages. Both of
these measures are estimated to have negative effects on firm arrears Wit, consistent with the
neoclassical explanation, but sales growth is statistically insignificant when firm fixed effects are
included. In both the pooled OLS and fixed effects specification, however, the lagged local arrears Ω it1

is estimated to have a positive and highly significant impact. The coefficient implies that an increase

in Ω it-1 of one monthly wage bill tends to raise Wit by a third to a half of a monthly wage bill. The
results for the control variables show that firms with low levels of unionization tend to have lower
arrears, as do firms providing fringe benefits (housing, kind ergartens, and training). More isolated
communities (smaller cities and rural areas) tend to have higher arrears, as do particular industries
(machine building and agriculture), which is consistent with previous research.
***INSERT TABLE 5 HERE***
Alternative tests of the two models against each other are shown in Table 6, which contains the
results from specifying alternative measures of growth and liquidity into the firm fixed effect
specification from Table 5. We consider these alternative measures separately because they are highly
correlated with one another. Consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2, all the growth and liquidity variables
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have the correct signs – negative for every variable except the dummy for frozen bank account. Most
of these variables are statistically significant, but some of them only weakly so. Regardless of the
specification, however, the effect of lagged local wage arrears remains large and highly statistically
significant. The magnitude ranges from around .3 to .4, depending on the exact specification. 8 These
results provide strong support for Hypothesis 5 that wage arrears become legitimized through
interactions in local communities.
***INSERT TABLE 6 HERE***
Worker Reactions
Our final sets of results concern the mechanisms through which community legitimization
processes may take place: worker responses through voice (strikes and protests) and exit (quits).
Table 7 presents the findings from this analysis. In both cases, the data provide some support for
neoclassical Hypotheses 3 and 4 – with respect to firms in communities with low arrears. In such
localities, an increase in Wit-1 of one monthly wage bill tends to raise the strike probability by 0.3
percent and the quit rate by 1.2 percent. The results also show, however, that worker responses to
arrears are strongly affected by the extent of arrears in their local environment. With respect to quit
behavior, the coefficient on the interaction term of –0.0023 is highly significant and implies that after
local wage arrears reach a level of about 5 monthly wage bills, on average, workers stop responding to
their own arrears by quitting. 9 With respect to the probability of strike and protest behavior, the
marginal effect on the interaction term is –0.0007 and statistically significant, implying that around a
level of Oit-1 = 4, workers no longer respond to an increase in their own arrears by striking. These
results imply that the neoclassical model applies only to communities with low arrears; in those where

8

We estimated many versions of these equations, all of them producing similar findings to those in Table 6. Among other
specifications, we included all of our growth and liquidity measures in a single “kitchen sink” regression, and the estimated
local wage arrears effect remained large and highly significant. The coefficients on the growth and liquidity measures are
much more sensitive, due to multicollinearity among these variables, so we prefer the specifications shown in Table 6.
9
Although the possible presence of correlated unobserved heterogeneity is less obvious in this equation than in the wage
arrears function, we also estimated the quit function including firm fixed effects. The results were qualitatively similar, and
ϕ12 remained highly statistically significant.
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arrears are high, the responses of workers are inconsistent with this model. By contrast, our findings
strongly support the institutional hypotheses that the level of arrears in the community attenuates the
exit and voice responses of workers to their own arrears.
***INSERT TABLE 7 HERE***
DISCUSSION
We have examined both neoclassical and institutional explanations of why wage arrears have
spread so widely in Russia during the 1990s. Our results support the vie wpoint that the poor economic
environment in Russia has led some firms to adopt wage arrears practices.

Yet the evidence also

shows that this theoretical perspective is insufficient to explain the patterns of wage arrears practices in
Russia. For instance, the wage adjustment story suggests that firms that engage in wage arrears should
be downsizing employment and reducing wages in the face of declining sales and output. Our data
shows that this is not correct. Many firms that implement wage arrears are simultaneously hiring new
employees and expanding their activities.
Similarly, the wage adjustment exp lanation provides little insight into the strong local variation
in the level of wage arrears and employee opposition to this practice. Even after controlling for firm
performance, the community in which a firm operates clearly influences the decision of whether to
engage in this practice. Moreover, a similar community difference is observed in the data on strikes
and quits. Workers are not simply responding to their immediate experience of wage arrears in their
own firms but are clearly influenced by the broader community context in which they find themselves.
We have argued that these workers interpret wage arrears differently than workers in other
communities. In some communities wage arrears represent an exceptional activity that is actively
opposed, while in others wage arrears have become a legitimate organizational practice that is rarely
contested.
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The linkage between organizational adoption and worker opposition provides an important
explanation of why wage arrears spread in Russia during the 1990s. If workers perceive wage arrears
as an external component of the environment beyond their ability to influence, then it is less likely that
workers will engage in active mobilization to try to effect change. The lack of opposition from
workers increases the perception among managers that they can adopt wage arrears practices with
relatively little cost. Both firm and employee actions (or lack of action) have contributed to the
growing acceptance of wage arrears as a legitimate organizational practice in many Russian
communities.
Yet why don’t Russian workers engage in collective action to try to change this vicious circle?
On one hand, the lack of worker collective mobilization may be viewed as a “rational” response to an
institutional environment in which workers have little power to change existing rules and beliefs.
Workers may not seek to quit in these environments simply because there are no alternative forms of
employment available. Moreover, employees may not strike because they are truly powerless in these
communities to force monopolistic organizations to change their practice. However, as Piven and
Cloward (1977: 7) remark, workers often “become defiant. They challenge traditional authorities, and
the rules laid down by those authoritie s.” An objective calculation of “interest” is difficult to calculate
under these conditions because workers often engage in the types of behavior that transform both their
own and their employers’ interests.
A comparison of the Russian case to the Great Depression in the United States further
illustrates the importance of historical process and subjective belief in defining what is, and what is
not, open to strategic contestation.

During the Great Depression, numerous firms failed to meet

contractual obligations, leading to widespread bankruptcy and lay-offs. Yet there is little evidence that
American organizations engaged in widespread use of wage arrears during this time period. The
ability of the state to enforce a rule of law provides one explanation of why American firms in the
Depression differed from contemporary Russian firms. However, a second powerful constraint on
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employer behavior during the U.S. Depression was worker activism. For instance, worker strikes shut
down the entire town of San Francisco in 1933 over a worker dispute concerning wage payments and
amounts (see Starr, 1996).
Even under difficult economic conditions, U.S. workers perceived that they had the ability to
change the practices of managers. By engaging in active opposition, they in turn shaped the broader
institutional environment in which organizations operated. In comparison, many Russian workers during the 1990s did not engage in active efforts to change the social norms in which they lived. Instead
of being constantly challenged, the practice of wage arrears became a relatively stable part of the environment in a number of localities in the Russian environment. Workers clearly dislike wage arrears,
yet their inaction in attempting to end this practice only strengthens the ability of ma nagers to adopt it
with few adverse consequences. 10
Our emphasis on the relationship between community norms of legitimate behavior and the
collective mobilization of workers relates to recent attempts to bridge research between orga nizational
and social movement theory (see Davis and Thompson, 1994; Strang and Soule, 1998). In particular,
the ideas of cognitive frames in the social movement literature are clearly related to the concept of
cognitive beliefs in the institutional literature. Social movement theorists posit that frames provide the
meaning by which individuals define what is possible within their environments: “the social
arrangements that are perceived as just and immutable must become to be seen as injust and mutable”
before collective action is initiated (Piven and Cloward, 1977: 12). Similarly, we have argued that an
important consequence of community norms in organizational activity is that they frame what is
perceived as legitimate forms of organizational behavior. To managers, community norms define the
“strategies of action” available to them. In western countries, for instance, a consistent policy of
delayed wage payments remains outside the menu of strategic options that most organizations analyze

10

Javeline (2003) makes a similar point in her analysis of workers’ attitudes. She finds that individuals who can identify
specific blame for wage arrears are more likely to strike, independently of their normative attitudes toward this practice.
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when faced with negative demand shocks. In Russia during the 1990s, however, this strategy became
a legitimate alternative that most managers consciously considered, even if they ultimately decided that
it was not the appropriate strategy for their particular firm.
Community norms are important not only because they frame the set of strategic actions open
to managers, but also because they similarly frame the set of organizational strategies that other groups
of actors consider to be normal and appropriate within a community. The lack of action among
potential opponents to a new practice may be as important an indicator of the legitimacy of an
organizational practice as is the presence of managerial action in adopting the new activity. We have
emphasized the importance of social norms in defining what employees consider to be possible within
a community. If workers believe that an organizational practice is outside their ability to change, then
the less likely they will be to actively oppose it, independently of whether they consider it to be just or
injust.
A limitation of our analysis is that, besides remarking on the general illegality of this practice,
we have not explicitly exa mined the role of the state in the diffusion of wage arrears in Russia.
Clearly, an important factor in the Russian case is the weak rule of law that exists in the country as a
whole, thereby limiting the availability of options that workers have in using political mechanisms to
curtail practices they consider to be injust. A direct analysis of state action is needed in the Russian
case because the assumption that state agencies will enforce the law cannot be assumed.
However, an important conclusion of this study is that the relationship between community
norms and organizational practice extends beyond the study of state and markets. In the absence of
law enforcement by the state, managers acted to construct and maintain their own norms of legitimate
behavior. The increasing adoption of wage arrears increased the community- wide use of this practice,
which, at the same time, decreased employee opposition to it. In this way, institutional theory shares a
common assumption with recent research in the economic history literature that emphasizes the
important role of path dependent trajectorie s of institutional persistence and change (North, 1990,
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1996). Collective outcomes in organizational systems cannot be explained solely as a product of
efficient market processes; instead, the ways in which communities construct and contest social norms
of legitimate behavior must also be examined.
The wage arrears case demonstrates that the evolution of these norms cannot be explained
solely through a study of the regulatory rules or normative values of a community. Community norms
may emerge from the interaction of local actors as they develop collective routines and knowledge
through common experience and history. Both managers and employees shape, and are shaped by, the
community in which they operate. The institutional dynamics by which communities construct and
confer legitimacy therefore have important effects on both the diffusion and persistence of new forms
of organizational behavior.
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Figure 1: Neoclassical Wage Adjustment Model
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Table 1: Incidence and Magnitude of Wage Arrears in the Firm Sample, 1991-1999
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Proportion of firms with
wage arrears

0.075

0.098

0.132

0.221

0.375

0.483

0.597

0.586

0.255

Mean stock of wage
arrears, W (monthly wage
bills)

0.147

0.255

0.334

0.644

1.143

1.725

2.363

2.501

0.709

Frequency distribution of W (stock of arrears)
0
0.925
0.904
1 month
0.037
0.035
2-3 months
0.028
0.041
4-6 months
0.006
0.014
>6 months
0.004
0.006

0.870
0.041
0.060
0.021
0.008

0.780
0.064
0.106
0.037
0.014

0.625
0.075
0.208
0.063
0.029

0.517
0.064
0.234
0.146
0.039

0.403
0.081
0.277
0.145
0.094

0.414
0.080
0.246
0.150
0.109

0.745
0.068
0.126
0.043
0.018

E(W|W>0)
N (sample size)

1.974

2.661

2.575

2.921

3.051

3.571

3.960

4.269

2.775

509

512

516

517

523

534

553

560

278

Notes: Sample consists of agricultural and industrial firms responding to wage arrears question.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, 1998
Variable Name
Industry (N=560)
Energy / Fuel
Metallurgy / Chemicals
Machine Building
Building Materials / Wood
Light
Food
Other manufacturing
Agriculture
Location (N=560)
Moscow or St. Petersburg
Regional Capital City
Other City
Non-City
Union Density (N=541)
0-9%
10-59%
60-79%
80-89%
90-99%
100%
Fringe benefits provided by firm
Training (dummy, N=554)
Kindergarten (dummy, N=555)
Housing (dummy, N=550)

N

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Hiring costs
Number of days for hiring and training
Non-reported training costs (dummy)

499
560

87.960
0.109

91.539
0.312

Growth measures, G
Hiring rate (ratio to average employment)
One-year growth in sales
One-year growth in output
One-year growth in real wages
One-year growth in nominal wages
One-year growth in employment
Received patents (dummy)

412
410
454
424
424
467
474

0.209
-0.238
-0.248
-0.162
0.063
-0.094
0.152

0.258
0.502
0.440
0.327
0.317
0.216
0.359

0.196
0.104
0.091
0.092
0.237
0.281

Liquidity measures, L
Profitability (profit/output)
Positive profit (dummy)
Frozen bank account (dummy)
Barter in payments for inputs (dummy)
Barter in sales (dummy)
Overdue receivables (dummy)
Overdue payables (dummy)

452
454
545
451
479
423
422

-0.192
0.557
0.640
0.772
0.791
0.752
0.758

1.039
0.497
0.480
0.420
0.407
0.432
0.429

0.561
0.268
0.245

Worker responses
Occurrence of strikes, S (dummy)
Quit rate, Q (ratio to average employment)

560
417

0.055
0.198

0.229
0.209

Mean
0.080
0.077
0.313
0.105
0.084
0.132
0.075
0.134
0.113
0.352
0.327
0.209

Variable Name
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Table 3: Wage Arrears by Growth and Liquidity of Firms, 1998
Mean Wage Arrears
Growth and Liquidity
Measures

Definition of
Expanding/
Liquid Firms

Sales

Positive real sales
growth

Output

Positive real
output growth

Real wages

Increase in real
wages

Nominal wages

Increase in
nominal wages

Employment

Increase in
employment

Hiring rate

Hiring rate above
the median

Profitability
(profit/output)

Positive profit

Received patents
(dummy)
Frozen bank account
(dummy)
Barter in payments for
inputs (dummy)

Received patents

Barter in sales
(dummy)
Overdue receivables
(dummy)
Overdue payables
(dummy)

Account not
frozen
No barter
payments for
inputs
No barter
received for sales
No overdue
receivables
No overdue
payables

t-test for
difference:
E(Wi |G i>0) –
E(Wi |G i<0)
0.423

Declining
Firms
E(Wi |G i<0)

Expanding
Firms
E(Wi |G i>0)

2.696a
(0.191)
[314]
2.551a
(0.180)
[356]
2.526a
(0.181)
[308]
3.390a
(0.316)
[135]
3.063a
(0.202)
[321]
3.193a
(0.271)
[207]
4.001a
(0.286)
[201]
2.191a
[402]
3.515a
[349]

2.528a
(0.355)
[96]
2.687a
(0.319)
[98]
2.897a
(0.365)
[116]
2.271a
(0.188)
[289]
1.716a
(0.219)
[146]
2.358a
(0.213)
[205]
1.580a
(0.145)
[253]
1.704a
[72]
0.812a
[196]

2.739a
[348]

2.538a
[103]

0.554

2.801a
[379]
3.236a
[318]
3.291a
[320]

2.300a
[100]
1.274a
[105]
1.050a
[102]

1.369

-0.357

-1.006

3.198a

4.032a

2.416b

7.993a

1.314
9.765a

Best
Firms
E(Wi |G i >
Gi+.75 )
2.965a
(1.022)
[23]
3.188a
(0.819)
[24]
3.231a
(0.897)
[26]
2.587a
(0.501)
[70]
1.649a
(0.303)
[37]
2.510a
(0.287)
[103]
1.591a
(0.340)
[64]
-

5.129a
5.840a

-

Notes: Standard errors for the estimate of the mean wage arrears are in parentheses; numbers of observations are in brackets.
a
significant at 1% level; b significant at 5% level; c significant at 10% level. “Best firms” are defined at the 25% percentile of
expanding firms for each variable.
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Table 4: Percentage of Firms Located in High-Wage Arrears Communities,
by Growth and Liquidity of Firms, 1998
Declining Firms ( Gi < 0)
Expanding Firms (G i > 0)
Wi = 0
Wi > 0
Wi = 0
Wi > 0
Prob(O i > O med | Gi, Wi)
41.7
72.2
28.6
68.9
Sales
[120]
[194]
[35]
[61]
37.9
70.8
25.0
66.1
Output
[140]
[216]
[36]
[62]
36.1
67.2
29.6
75.0
Real wages
[119]
[189]
[44]
[72]
29.3
67.0
36.1
70.7
Nominal wages
[41]
[94]
[122]
[167]
38.0
69.7
30.4
68.7
Employment
[100]
[221]
[79]
[67]
34.3
71.6
39.2
65.9
Hiring rate
[73]
[134]
[79]
[126]
43.8
72.6
33.1
69.1
Profitability (profit/output)
[48]
[153]
[127]
[126]
31.8
69.8
36.8
64.7
Received patents (dummy)
[170]
[232]
[38]
[34]
33.3
69.6
35.5
68.3
Frozen bank account (dummy)
[69]
[280]
[155]
[41]
37.2
67.8
29.3
75.8
Barter in inputs (dummy)
[121]
[227]
[41]
[62]
39.8
68.1
22.2
72.7
Barter in sales (dummy)
[128]
[251]
[45]
[55]
38.0
69.9
34.8
69.4
Overdue receivables (dummy)
[92]
[226]
[69]
[36]
39.4
69.5
30.9
70.6
Overdue payables (dummy)
[94]
[226]
[68]
[34]
Growth and Liquidity
Measures

Notes: Numbers of observations with non-missing growth and liquidity measures for each cell are in brackets.
“High-wage arrears locations” refer to the 24 out of 49 locations/raions with the highest average level of wage
arrears. The t-test for the difference of means between firms without and with arrears (Wi = 0 and Wi > 0,
respectively) is significant at the 1% level for each measure of growth and liquidity, except for “received patents”
among growing firms, where the significance level is 1.8%.
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Table 5: Wage Arrears Function Estimates
Pooled OLS
Coeff.
t
a
0.460
5.56
-0.306a
-2.75
-0.420b
-1.99

Independent variables

O: Lagged local wage arrears (months)
G: Sales growth
L: Nominal wage growth
Union density (100% is omitted)
0-9%
-0.741a
10-59%
0.245
60-78%
-0.034
80-89%
0.066
90-100%
0.129
Fringe benefits provided by firms (dummies)
Training
-0.660a
Kindergartens
-0.003
Housing purchase and construction
-0.299b
Training costs (days)
0.000
Non-reported training costs (dummy)
0.719b
Federal districts (Central is omitted)
North West
0.347
South
0.040
Volga
-0.048
Urals
0.178
Siberia
0.617b
Far East
0.168
Type of location (Moscow and St. Petersburg are omitted)
Regional capital city
-0.134
Other city
-0.367
Non-city
-0.515
Industry (Energy/Fuel is omitted)
Metallurgy/Chemicals
-0.512
Machine building
0.297
Building materials/Wood processing
-0.133
Light
-0.811a
Food
-1.202a
Other manufacturing
-0.843a
Agriculture
2.153
Intercept
0.081

Firm Fixed Effects
Coeff.
t
a
0.368
4.69
-0.110
-1.26
-0.432a
-2.65

-2.82
1.17
-0.15
0.27
0.97

1.027b
1.018a
1.006a
0.740b
0.540b

1.96
2.58
2.91
2.38
2.16

-4.77
-0.03
-2.26
0.59
2.45

-0.980a
-0.153
-0.098
-

-3.56
-0.72
-0.49
-

0.13
0.22
-0.29
0.09
2.26
0.43

-

-

-0.45
-1.31
-1.48

-

-

-2.32
1.54
-0.54
-3.99
-6.02
-3.65
5.59
0.45

R2 = 0.307

0.457
2.65
2
R within = 0.199
R2 overall = 0.156

Notes: Dependent variable = Wit (stock of wage arrears). a significant at 1% level; b significant at 5% level; c significant at
10% level; t-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors. N = 1624. Year dummies are included but not shown
here.
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Table 6: Alternative Specifications of Growth and Liquidity Measures
in Wage Arrears Functions
Model Specifications
1
2
3
4
a
a
a
0.342
0.377
0.304
0.301a
Oit-1: Lagged local wage arrears (months)
(5.83)
(5.95)
(4.36)
(4.50)
c
-0.116
Git: Output growth
(-1.65)
0.834a
Lit: Frozen bank account (dummy)
(7.43)
-0.508c
Git: One-year change in employment
(-1.77)
-0.712a
Lit: Positive profit (dummy)
(-5.49)
-0.788b
Git: Rate of hiring
(-2.07)
-0.190a
Lit: Profitability (profit/output)
(-2.71)
-0.673a
Git: Received patents (dummy)
(-3.33)
-0.255b
Lit: Real wage growth
(-2.15)
N
2575
2244
1867
2126
2
R within
0.213
0.233
0.240
0.189
2
R overall
0.243
0.241
0.203
0.093
Independent variables

Notes: Dependent variable = Wit (stock of wage arrears). a significant at 1% level; b significant at 5% level;
c
significant at 10% level; t-statistics are calculated with robust standard errors. All five specifications use
firm fixed effects, the same set of control variables as in Table 4, plus the additional growth and liquidity
measures shown.
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Table 7: Worker Responses to Firm and Local Arrears
Strike Incidence
(probit)
Independent variables
Marginal
t
effect
Wit-1
0.0030a
4.92
0.0011
1.05
Ω it-1
b
-0.0007
-2.35
Wit-1*Ω it-1
Union density (100% is omitted)
0-9%
0.000
0.03
10-59%
0.003
0.66
c
60-78%
0.009
1.91
80-89%
0.005
1.23
90-100%
0.001
0.25
Fringe benefits provided by firms (dummies)
Training
0.004c
1.81
Kindergartens
-0.001
-0.43
Housing purchase and
0.004c
1.78
construction
Training costs (days) /100
0.002a
3.05
Non-reported training costs
0.002
0.55
(dummy)
Type of location (Moscow and St. Petersburg is omitted)
Regional capital city
0.007
1.59
Other city
0.000
0.11
Non-city
-0.006
-1.32
Intercept
N=3848
Pseudo R2=0.213

Quit Rate
(OLS)
Coeft
ficient
0.0116a
4.18
0.0004
0.11
a
-0.0023
-2.84
0.038c
0.020c
-0.010
0.004
0.001

1.70
1.67
-0.82
0.36
0.21

-0.019b
-0.012c
-0.012c

-2.27
-1.69
-1.79

-0.009a
0.003

-2.83
0.26

0.007
0.66
c
0.021
1.75
-0.030c
-1.78
0.113
6.98
N=2358
R2=0.133

Notes: Dependent variable in the strike incidence equation = S it (dummy variable for strike or worker
protest). Dependent variable in the quit rate equation = Qit (ratio of number quitting to average
employment). a significant at 1% level; b significant at 5% level; c significant at 10% level; t-statistics are
calculated with robust standard errors. Year and industry dummies are included but not shown here.
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